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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,
a Utah limited liability
company,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Utah
body politic and political
subdivision of the State
of Utah,

Docket No. 20070137CA
[Argument priority 15]

Defendant-Appellee

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is granted
pursuant to order of the Utah Supreme Court to "pour over"
this case to the Court of Appeals, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 78-2a-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code .
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This

appeal

(and

the

predicate

factual

situation

surrounding it) presents the following issues for review:
1.

The

District

Court

erred

in

failing

to

properly apply and follow the Nollan-Dolan "rough
proportionality" standard against the Plaintiff's
"inverse

condemnation"

claims for $400,000+

as

"just compensation" payment for constitutionallyexcessive roadway improvements and dedications,
pursuant to the remand of the Utah Supreme Court

in its appellate decision in this case, 2006 UT 2,
128 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2006). The District Court's
failure to properly consider and apply the Dolan
"rough proportionality" (the government must make
a pre-taking "individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature
and

extent

to

development")

the

impact

standard

of

the

includes,

proposed

but

is

necessarily limited to:
a.

Incorrectly

concluding

that

the

3.04% of the increased traffic count is
"roughly proportional" (i.e. "related in
scope

and

nature")

to

the

required

payment of 10 0.0 0% of the improvement
costs of the 3500 South Street roadway,
the major portion of which is utilized by
the

public-at-large

96.96%
those

benefit

which

perhaps

improvements, which

derives
more
are

a

from
of

no

direct benefit to the residents of the
new development, who benefit therefrom
only as members of the public-at-large,
which

should,

per

the

constitutional

mandates, pay just compensation for such
improvements.
b.

Incorrectly

concluding

that

the

3.04% "impact" (as measured by increased
2

not

traffic

count

of

vehicles

upon

the

roadway) mathematically correlates (i.e.
is "roughly proportional") to a required
right-of-way dedication which constitutes
2.2%

of

the

total

real

estate

the

Developer proposed for development.
c.

Rejecting the Developer's claims for

the out-of-pocket expenses (in excess of
$200,000) mandatorily incurred for the
roadway improvements to 3500 South Street
in addition to the required real estate
"dedication".
d.
law"

Rejecting
claims

relationship"
Banberry

the

Developer's

[i.e. lack of
and

reasonableness"]

"reasonable

violation

"constitutional
which

are

"state

of

the

standard
the

of

stated

equivalent to the "rough proportionality"
standard of Dolan.
2.

The District Court erred in evaluating the

evidence and the Dolan "burden of proof" [to the
effect that the governmental entity
COUNTY

SALT LAKE

has the affirmative duty of making a pre-

exaction "individualized determination" that the
exactions required (i.e. 3500 South Street roadway
improvements) are "roughly proportional" , in scope
and nature, to the impact created by the B.A.M.
3

project [i.e. approximately 440 vehicles per day,
constituting less than 3.04% of the additional
traffic generated upon the pre-existing roadway,
but for which B.A.M. was required to install
improvements which
of the roadway

for that "frontage" segment

essentially tripled (from 12,000

vehicles per day to a COUNTY-acknowledged 37,000
vehicles per day) the vehicle carrying-capacity of
the roadway segment] and for which B.A.M. was
required to pay 100% of the cost. A mere 3.04% of
the "impact" (as described in "vehicle trips per
day")

is not, as

a matter

of

law,

"roughly

proportional" to the required payment of 100% of
the cost of the improvements.
3.

The

District

Court

erred

in

refusing

to

consider the constitutionally-related claims of
"equal protection of the laws", "uniform operation
of laws", and the "constitutional standard of
reasonableness" in evaluating Plaintiff's claims
of having to pay 100% of the 3500 South Street
roadway

improvements

$400,000+),

when

the

costs
COUNTY

(approximately
did

not

require

corresponding exactions from similarly-situated
developments, in the same geographical area and
having a similarly-situated traffic impact (as
described in vehicles per day upon the roadway) .
4.

The District Court erred in failing to award
4

the Plaintiff compensation for the economic value
of those COUNTY-required improvements singularly
serving off-site areas to the west of the B.A.M.
development (namely, upsizing of underground storm
sewer line, relocation of power/telephone poles,
and corrective measures for church exit driveway
interfacing with roadway) not made necessary, per
se, by Plaintiff's development but nevertheless
required

by

the

COUNTY

as

part

of

the

comprehensive development.
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The interpretation and application of provisions of the
state and national constitutions as well as Utah statute by
the trial

court

conclusions

of

are matters of
law

in

civil

law. The trial
cases

are

court's

reviewed

for

correctness. United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme Court 1993);
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339,
1341 (Utah Supreme Court 1993).
This standard of review has also been referred to as a
"correction of error standard". Jacobsen Investment Company
vs State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 789, 790 (Utah Supreme
Court 1992);

Sanders vs Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah

Supreme Court 1992).

"Correction of error" means that no

particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
Supreme Court 1994) ; Provo River Water Users7 Association vs
5

Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate
court decides the matter for itself and. does not defer in
any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State
vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) ; Howell
vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1997 the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT
develop

a

15-acre

parcel

proposed to

of previously-unimproved

real

estate located at approximately 7700 West 3500 South, within
the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County and subject to
and within the geopolitical jurisdiction (for development
approval issues) of Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY. The proposed
development

the

"Westridge

Meadows"

subdivision

consisted of single-family residential building lots, each
approximately 10,000+ square feet in size.
SALT LAKE COUNTY personnel informed the Plaintiff that
the COUNTY would then (in 1997) require, as a condition of
development approval for the subdivision, the dedication and
improvement of 3500 South Street

actually a Utah public

roadway within the jurisdiction of the Utah Department of
Transportation [UDOT]

to the 40-foot "half-width".

The Plaintiff undertook actions to begin development
approval and in September 1997 obtained from the COUNTY
Planning

Commission

"preliminary

and

final

development

approval" of the proposed development. Sometime between
October 1997 and December 1997 COUNTY personnel "lost" the
6

subdivision plat, forcing B.A.M. to prepare a second plat.
Relying upon the commitments made within and pursuant
to the "preliminary plat approval" granted by the COUNTY
three months before (in September 1997), B.A.M. purchased
the

14-acre

parcel.

The

property

description

thereof

extended "to the centerline of the roadway", although at the
time 3500 South Street had a paved half-width

(eastbound

lane) of only approximately 17 feet of pavement.
In January 1998 COUNTY personnel informed the Plaintiff
that the COUNTY was, in essence, rescinding the previously
granted

"preliminary

development

approval"

and

would

require, as a condition of development approval, dedication
and improvement

of a 53-foot half-width

for 3500 South

Street.
The Plaintiff protested and appealed this requirement
(i.e. the 53-foot dedication), first to the County Planning
Commission and ultimately to the Salt Lake County Board of
County Commissioners, which in July 1998 voted to refuse to
even consider the B.A.M. appeal, thus implicitly upholding
the

Ordinance

requirement

for

the

53-foot

dedication and improvement. This litigation

half-width

as a straight-

forward, garden variety "inverse condemnation" case seeking
reimbursement of the "unconstitutional takings" effected by
the COUNTY

followed.1

[In actuality, the litigation was

^his case is NOT, as the COUNTY has claimed, an "appeal" from
a "land-use decision", which characterization presents an
inappropriate stereotype of what the case is actually about.
7

filed in August 1998 and was underway for an entire year
while the proposed subdivision was being approved, which
finally occurred in August 1999. Any claims made by the
COUNTY that it was unaware of the claims being made against
it in the litigation, that B.A.M. had struck some kind of
deal to pursue only a certain amount or nature of claim, or
that B.A.M. had agreed to install certain improvements, are
disingenuous and misleading. B.A.M. was merely unwillingly
agreeing to do what the COUNTY'S highway-abutting Ordinance
already required B.A.M. to do. B.A.M. certainly could not
request that the COUNTY not obey its own ordinance, nor
could the COUNTY agree to ignore the mandatory provisions of
its own ordinance. To imply
claim

as the COUNTY may hereafter

that the COUNTY was not given an opportunity to

administratively
disingenuous:
litigation

deal

the

was

COUNTY

pending

with
had
to

B.A.M.'s
an

not

entire
require

claims

is

year while

the

the

excessive

dedications, and so forth. And for over eight years after
the development has been approved and the litigation was
pending, the COUNTY could have proposed a settlement. The
COUNTY fought the litigation and resisted every step of the
way; the COUNTY has had more than ample opportunity to
"settle" the case, on any and all issues.]
The case was tried before Judge Timothy Hanson of the
Third District Court. Judge Hanson ruled, on the basis of
COUNTY arguments, that there was a "rational basis" for the
COUNTY-required exactions, and disallowed the B.A.M. claims
8

for "just compensation".
The original appeal was directed to the Utah Supreme
Court, which "poured over" the appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. In February 2004 the Utah Court of Appeals issued
its opinion. B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. vs Salt Lake County,
2004 UT App 34, 87 P.3d 710 (Utah App 2004) . All three Court
of Appeals judges determined the Nollan-Dolan standard was
applicable to this litigation, however a two-judge Court of
Appeals plurality decided the case should be "remanded" back
to the County government, for an administrative hearing and
determination of Plaintiff's claims. Judge Orme dissented
from that portion of the ruling.
Both

parties

thereafter

filed

cross-petitions

for

certiorari review of the Court of Appeals decision. The
COUNTY sought
Plaintiff
issues

as

review on the Nollan-Dolan

sought

review

decided

by

of
the

the

standard;

"administrative

two-judge

Court

of

the

remand"
Appeals

plurality. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari review
on the three narrow issues it framed for the certiorari
review. In January 2006 the Utah Supreme Court issued its
written opinion

[2006 UT 2, 128 P. 3d 1161

(Utah Supreme

Court 2006)] in which the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the applicability of the Nollan-Dolan standard. The Supreme
Court overruled the Court of Appeals on the "administrative
remand" issue and affirmatively directed the case be sent
back only to the District Court, for its determination of
the case, using the Nollan-Dolan standard.
9

In October 2006 Judge Hanson of the District Court
conducted a one-day "bench trial" hearing, in which the
Court

took

additional

evidence

on

the

"rough

proportionality" issue.
In late-December 2006 the District Court issued a
"Memorandum Decision" in which the District Court, without
apparently attempting a scholarly analysis

or at least

visibly putting that effort onto the printed page

of the

Dolan "rough proportionality" standard applied to the facts
or evidence adduced during the case, ruled in favor of the
COUNTY. This appeal followed.
The Utah Supreme Court has again "poured over" the
appeal to the Court of Appeals for adjudication.
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
The Appellant's arguments are summarized as follows:
1.

An "impact" of 3.04% in increased traffic

count (as measured in vehicle-trips-per day, of
440 trips-per-day) is not "roughly proportional"
to requiring the Developer-Plaintiff to dedicate
real estate and effect improvements equivalent to
100% of the cost thereof, regardless of how much
real estate the Developer had initially and/or was
actually taken.
2.

Any seeming correlation between the "impact"

measured in vehicles on-the-road

(i.e. "traffic

count") and the percentage of the land-dedication
is

totally

coincidental
10

and

represents

a

misunderstanding on the part of both the COUNTY
and

the

District

Court

as

to

the

substantive

requirements of Dolan.
3.

The District Court

in ostensibly believing

that all developments "fronting" on an existing
public road must install improvements
roadway

for that

erred in disregarding the Plaintiff's

claim for the out-of-pocket expenses associated
with the installation of those improvements, which
are unconstitutionally "excessive" in light of the
COUNTY-required barrier
"internal

street"

fence and the required

frontage

servicing

the

northernmost row of building lots.
4.

The District Court erred in failing to apply

the

Developer's

essentially

"state

law"

equivalent

claims
to

the

which

are

"rough

proportionality" standard of Dolan.
ARGUMENT
In simplest terms, this case is quite straight-forward:
1.
Plaintiff B.A.M. sought COUNTY development
approval for the development of a single-family
residential development (ultimately 44 building
lots), which generated approximately 440 vehicle
trips-per-day in increased traffic count.
2.
The 15-acre area proposed for development by
B.A.M. was immediately to the south of 3500 South
Street (actually a UDOT-controlled state highway),
in Salt Lake County.
3.
The paved portion of the "eastbound" lane of
3500 South Street was approximately 17 feet in
width across the almost 900-foot "frontage" of the
B.A.M. development.
11

4.
The pre-development "traffic count" of the
3500 South Street roadway was approximately 12,000
vehicles per day.
5.
The COUNTY required B.A.M.
which owned the
real estate "to the centerline of the roadway"
to dedicate a 53-foot "half-width" across the
entire frontage of its parcel, and to install
curb, gutter, sidewalk and other improvements.
6.
The COUNTY also required B.A.M. to install the
barrier fence across the entire "frontage" of the
development, thus effectively denying access to
3500 South Street for the northernmost "building
lots", for which "internal" street frontage with
improvements was additionally required.
[The
barrier fencing thus rendered the entirety of the
3500
South
Street
improvements
to
be
"unconstitutionally excessive", which is and has
always been the Plaintiff's "core" claim under the
Nollan-Dolan standard.]
7.
B.A.M. "lost" at least two "building lots",
currently worth in excess of $100,000 each, by
reason of the County's excessive real estate
dedication requirements.
8.
The COUNTY also required B.A.M. to expend in
excess of $200,000 in making roadway and other
unrelated improvements (i.e. storm sewer line
upsizing, power pole relocation, adjacent property
driveway realignment) as part of the 3500 South
Street improvements.
9.
Other nearby developments, including but
limited
to
the
nearby
"Elusive
Estates"
subdivision, essentially creating an equivalent
"traffic count" upon 3500 South Street, were not
required by the COUNTY to make any dedications or
improvements, notwithstanding the similar "impact"
such
other
similarly-situated
developments
actually created.
Reduced to a single rhetorical sentence, B.A.M.'s claim is
simply framed:
Why should B.A.M.
but for only the unfortunate
circumstance of geographical location of being
located immediately adjacent to a public roadway
[3500 South Street] which governmental authorities
want improved to a traffic count" carryingcapacity not needed until decades into the future
12

(i.e. calendar year 2020)
be presently coerced
to make "unconstitutionally excessive" dedications
of real estate and incur excessive out-of-pocket
expenses for roadway and unrelated improvements
costing hundreds of thousands of dollars
namely,
to pay for 100% of the cost of the roadway
when
the traffic count "impact" actually created by the
B.A.M. development was less but 3.04% of the total
vehicles on the roadway so impacted?
The rhetorical question is simply answered:
A 3.04% "impact" is not "roughly proportional"
(i.e "related in nature and extent") to a 100% of
the cost the Developer [B.A.M.] was expected to
shoulder, which costs
at least 96.96% thereof
should be borne by the public-at-large!
I
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED PROPERLY APPLY
AND FOLLOW THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARD
AS DIRECTED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
A
THE NOLLAN-DOLAN STANDARD OF "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY"
As early as 1980 the United States Supreme Court had
written:
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may
not
transform private property
into public
property without compensation,
even for the
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is
the very kind of thing that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary
use of governmental power.
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Incorporated vs Beckwith, 449 US
155 at 164, 101 SCt 446 at 452 (1980). Emphasis added.
In the

"landmark decision" of Nollan vs California

Coastal Commission, 483 US 825, 107 SCt 3141 (1987), the
United States Supreme Court addressed the "constitutional"
issue involved in an "in-kind exaction" such as here at

13

hand. The landowner owned a beachfront parcel upon which was
built a small, dilapidated bungalow the landowner desired to
demolish and replace with a larger residential structure. He
applied for permission to erect the larger structure, but
was denied development approval unless the propertyowner
granted to the public a public access easement across the
oceanside end of his parcel, upon which the public could
traverse the privately-owned in getting from one "public
beach" to another. Following state court decisions favorable
to the California Coastal Commission, the propertyowner
appealed to the United States Supreme Court which found the
requirement to dedicate the "public access" easement to
violate the United States Constitution. Justice Scalia,
writing

for

the

majority,

Commission's requirement

held

against

the

Coastal

(for the public easement) and

wrote:
Similarly here, the lack of nexus between the
condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something
other than it was. The purpose then becomes, quite
simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some
governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation. Whatever may be the outer limits of
"legitimate state interests" in the takings and
land use context, this is not one of them. In
short, unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the
building restriction is not a valid restriction of
land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion.
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. An "out-and-out plan of
extortion" are pretty strong words for the United States
Supreme Court to characterize local government actions. As
the "mathematical" applications described herein [in either
14

the "cost of existing facilities" or the "impact" (defined
in terms of daily traffic-count) context] clearly show, the
"de minimis", almost non-existent "reasonable relationship"
or "nexus" between the "permit condition" (i.e. the required
exaction = dedication and improvement) and the impact
created by the new development is such so as to render the
exaction

constitutionally

impermissible.

[The

COUNTY7 s

essentially-simultaneous granting of development approval
for the Elusive Estates subdivision

which actually MORE

traffic count to the 3500 South Street roadway, but which
was not required to undertake any exactions

effectively

precludes the COUNTY from claiming, disingenuously so, that
the required exactions (roadway dedication and improvement,
by B.A.M.) was in lieu of a "development ban".]
In Nollan the Supreme Court continued:
We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to
be more than a pleading requirement, and
compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier,
our cases describe the condition for abridgement
of property rights through the police power as a
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the objective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is a heightened risk that the
purpose
is avoidance
of
the
compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added.
In Nollan

the

Court

rejected

the

idea

that

the

governmental permission to develop was a "governmental
benefit" conferred upon the propertyowner. The Court wrote:
15

But the right to build on one's own property
even though its exercise can be subjected to
legitimate permitting requirements
cannot be
remotely described as a "governmental benefit".
And thus the announcement that the application for
(or granting of) the permit will entail the
yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded
as establishing a voluntary exchange.
Footnote at 107 SCt at 3147. Emphasis added.
In

examining

the

California

"comprehensive program"
equivalent

to

the

Coastal

Commission's

which is, arguably, the functional

COUNTY'S

assertedly

"uniform

and

comprehensive plan" of requiring "highway-abutting" parcels
to

effect

the

dedication

and

improvements

the

United

States Supreme Court in Nollan concluded:
. . . The Commission may well be right that it is
a good idea, but that does not establish that the
Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone can be
compelled do contribute to its realization.
Rather, California
is free to advance
its
"comprehensive program," if it wishes, by using
its power of eminent domain for this "public
purpose" see U.S. Const. Amdt. 5; but if it wants
an easement across Nollans property, it must pay
for it.
107 SCt at 3151. Emphasis added.
Nollan would not have been materially different in its
result had the California Legislature, by statute, declared
that all owners of "ocean-abutting" parcels needing building
permits are required to dedicate a "public easement" across
their parcels at water's edge. Nollan was decided
constitutes
substantive,

"the

law

of

the

"constitutional"

land"

on

principles,

the
not

basis
on

and
of
some

procedural technicality (i.e. how the "taking" decision was
made and/or by whom).
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In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309
(1994), the United States Supreme Court was presented with
the opportunity to revisit Nollan and to articulate "what is
the required degree of connection between the exactions
imposed by the city and the projected

impacts of the

proposed development." 114 SCt at 2312. In holding against
the municipality, the Court wrote:
One of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness, should be borne by the public as a
whole." (quoting Armstrong vs United States)

Under
the
well-settled
doctrine
of
"unconstitutional conditions", the government may
not require a person to give up a constitutional
right
here
the
right
to
receive
just
compensation when property is taken for public
use
in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the property has
little or no relationship to the benefit.
114 SCt at 2316-2317. Emphasis added.
In attempting to define the "degree of the exactions
demanded by the city's permit conditions bears to the
projected impact of petitioner's proposed development" [114
SCt at 2318] , the Court was faced with several legal
standards. In describing the various

standards and in

adopting a "federal standard" (for Just Compensation Clause)
purposes), the Dolan Court wrote:
A number of state courts have taken an
intermediate position, requiring the municipality
to show a "reasonable relationship" between the
required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development. Typical is the Supreme Court of
Nebraska's opinion in Simpson v. North Platte, 206
17

Neb. 240, 245, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1980), where
that court stated:
"The distinction, therefore, which must
be made between an appropriate exercise
of the police power and an improper
exercise of eminent domain is whether the
requirement
has
some
reasonable
relationship or nexus to the use to which
the property is being made or is merely
being used as an excuse for taking
property
simply
because
at
that
particular moment the landowner is asking
the city for some license or permit,"
Thus, the court held a city may not require a
property owner to dedicate property for some
future public use as a condition for obtaining a
building permit when such future use is not
"occasioned by the construction sought to be
permitted." Id., at 248, 292 N.W.2d, at 302.
Some form of the reasonable relationship test
has been adopted in many other jurisdictions.
[Citations to cases omitted.] Despite any semantic
differences, general agreement exists among the
courts "that the dedication should have some
reasonable relationship to the needs created by
the
[development]."
[Citation to authorities
omitted. ]
We think the "reasonable relationship" test
adopted by a majority of the states courts is
closer to the federal constitutional norm than
either of those previously discussed. But we do
not adopt it as such, partly because the term
"reasonable
relationship"
seems
confusingly
similar to the term "rational basis" which
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the
Equal
Protection
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
We
think
a
term
such
as
"rough
proportionality" best encapsulates what we hold to
be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No
precise mathematical calculation is required, but
the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development.
114 SCt at 2319-2320. Emphasis added. Citations to cases and
other authorities

cited in original Supreme Court text

have been omitted.]
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Thus, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a
legal standard which is "part law" and "part mathematics".
That mathematics is directly implicated in the application
of the Dolan standard is clearly indicated by:
1.

The Court's selection of the phrase "rough

proportionality"
connotes

a

itself:

a

mathematical

description

of

two

"proportionality"
comparison

and/or

numerically-measurable

quantities or concepts.
2.

The United States Supreme Court affirmatively

utilized the "mathematical" term itself, when the
Court stated "no precise mathematical calculation
is

required,

but

the

city

must

make

some

individualized determination". Emphasis added.
3.

The Court issued the Dolan decision for the

expressed

purpose

required

degree

of
of

resolving
connection

"what

is

between

the
the

exactions imposed by the city and the projected
impacts of the proposed development." 114 SCt at
2312. Emphasis added.
Although the term "rough proportionality" may connote
specific

legal and/or mathematical

(i.e. relationship)

concepts, the above-quoted language indicates that the
United

States

Supreme

Court

understands

the

"rough

proportionality" term to be such that
" . . . the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."
19

Id. Emphasis added. Thus, rather than focusing upon the
simplistic, two-word "roughly proportional" term itself, the
correct

analysis

should

be

upon

the

additional

text

contained within the Dolan opinion.
The "related" requirement (definition) of the "required
dedication" is thus separated into its two constituent
subparts:
a.
AND

"related in nature"

b.

"related in extent"

"Related in nature" has a certain QUALITATIVE connotation:
a like-kind, associative character, a similanty-in-kind,
apples-to-apples comparison suggested meaning. The phrase
"related

in extent" has a QUANTITATIVE

connotation: a

measuring, comparative, numerical counting meaning.
The word "both" in the original text confirms that EACH
of the TWO "related" requirements must be met. Thus, when
applied
B.A.M.'s

to a

specific

"required

the dedication must be

dedication"
"related

such as
in nature"

(qualitatively similar: like-kind, associative, similarityin-kind) AND "related in extent" (the dedication may not be
quantitatively "excessive"). Similarly, there must be a
correlation between the "required dedication" itself and the
actual "impact" of the new development.
With respect to the "rough proportionality" required to
be derived and shown (in a burden-of-proof context) by the
government, the Dolan court wrote:
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No precise mathematical calculation is
required, but the city must make some effort to
quantify its findings in support of the dedication
for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the
conclusory statement that it could offset some of
the traffic demand generated. . . . The city's
goal of reducing flooding hazards and traffic
congestion, and providing for public greenways,
are laudable, but there are outer limits to how
this may be done. "A strong public desire to
improve the public condition [will not] warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change."
[114 SCt at 2322. Emphasis added. Bracketed material in
original text.]
B
ANY MATHEMATICAL CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE
OF INCREASED "TRAFFIC COUNT" AND THE RELATIVE
PERCENTAGE OF THE DEVELOPER'S REAL ESTATE
SO "TAKEN" BY REASON OF THE REQUIRED DEDICATION
IS STRICTLY COINCIDENTAL AND IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE
WITH THE DOLAN STANDARD OF "ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY"
It is readily seen that the "purpose" of the COUNTY'S
Ordinance (mandating the "dedication/improvement") of the
highway, but only by those highway-abutting parcels, is
simply,
" . . . . the obtaining of an easement to serve
some governmental purpose, but without payment of
compensation.
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added. The Ordinance is that
transparent. Coupled with the acknowledged practice

that

adjacent parcels don't have to effect any dedication
"purpose"

is

simply

to

obtain

increased

the

roadway

improvements, but without paying for those improvements!
That's not a valid purpose, and Nollan and Dolan make that
point clear.
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Following remand from the Utah Supreme Court, the
District Court held on 17 October 2006 a one-day bench
trial, in which the Court received additional evidence and
considered new arguments. Following those arguments, the
Court took the matter under advisement.
In late-December 2006

literally two days before the

effective date of his previously-announced retirement
Judge Timothy Hansen issued his "Memorandum Decision", in
which he found for the Defendant COUNTY on all issues and
claims. Except for some otherwise-conclusory text, Judge
Hansen

in his

"Memorandum

Decision" made

no

specific

findings, but rather directed counsel for the COUNTY to
prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together
with a final judgment ruling in favor of the Defendant.
The Defendant's counsel prepared the formal findings,
conclusions and judgment, promptly lodged the same with the
District

Court, which

almost

immediately

signed

those

Findings, Conclusion and judgment. This appeal followed.
Assuming

as must be the case

"findings" and

that the COUNTY-prepared

"conclusions" represent what the COUNTY

believes to be the most favorable evidence (i.e. the facts)
and the particular legal result (i.e. the law) arising from
the remand trial, and given the fact that the District Court
promptly "signed" those findings and conclusions, both the
COUNTY and the District Court will be "stuck with" those
findings and conclusions.
As

shown

herein,

the

"findings
22

and

conclusions"

evidence a complete lack of understanding as to how the
Nollan-Dolan standard of "rough proportionality" is to be
conceptually understood and is to be applied to the instant
situation.
As

is

shown

herein,

any

apparent2

mathematical

correlation between the 3.04% additional vehicles on the
road with the 1.89% or 2.2% percentage of the Developer's
real

estate

strictly

area

taken

coincidental

for
and

right-of-way
has

no

dedication

legal

or

is

factual

significance. The operative "findings" and "conclusions"
as prepared by the COUNTY and as accepted by the District
Court

are thus:

Findings:
18. As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms.
Pullos determined that BAM's proposed subdivision
development was likely to generate an additional
440 vehicle trips per day on 3500 South street.
This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips
per day per additional housing unit.

20. Ms. Pullos determined that the additional 440
vehicle trips per day likely to be generated by
BAM's
proposed
development
represented
an
increased traffic volume of 3.04% on 3500 South
street within the traffic link.
21. In conducting her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos
determined that the impact of the 3.04% increased
traffic volume likely to be created by BAM's
proposed development was roughly proportionate to
the
additional
land
required
for
highway

2

In making this assertion, the Plaintiff B.A.M. should not be
misconstrued or misunderstood to believe or state that the 3.04%
percentage is "roughly proportional" in nature and in scope to the
demand and needs created by the B.A.M. development. There simply is
no "rough proportionality", plain and simple.
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dedication by BAM, as a percentage of the entire
parcel owned by BAM.
[Emphasis added. This
"finding" by the District Court is flawed. In the
original (April 2001) bench trial, Ms Pullos gave
no testimony as concerning any percentage of
B.A.M.'s parcel. Ostensibly, this result was
because the COUNTY defended on the basis that
Dolan didn't apply to the case at bar. Whether
there was testimony or not, the written finding,
as so adopted by the District Court in 2006,
nevertheless evidences the flawed mathematical and
legal methodology the COUNTY presented to the
District
Court, which accepted
that
flawed
methodology.]

24. Therefore, the additional 13-feet of highway
dedication area required to be dedicated by BAM
represented 1.89% of the entire BAM parcel
(11,696.23/619,781.54 = .01887).

26. Therefore, the dedication resulted in a loss
to BAM of 2.22% of its available building lots
(1/45 = .02222). [Emphasis added.]
Conclusions of Law:
4.
The additional 440 vehicle trips per day
likely
to be
generated
by BAM's
proposed
development represented an increased traffic
volume on 3500 South street within the traffic
link, or "impact", of 3.04%.
5.
Whether the exaction at issue in this case is
considered as (a) a percentage of area of the
entire parcel owned by BAM comprising
the
Westridge subdivision (i.e. 1.89%), or (b) the
resulting percentage loss to BAM of its available
building lots (i.e. 2.22%), it [the exaction] was
"roughly proportionate" to the increased traffic
volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed
development. [Emphasis added. Bracket text added
for clarity]
[Bracketed

text

of

explanation

and

comment

added

Appellant's counsel, to specifically explain or rebut
stated "finding".]
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The Court of Appeals' attention is drawn to Paragraph
5 of the Conclusions, which essentially sums up the entirety
of the COUNTY'S

approach

opinion

undersigned,

of

the

and thus
as

illuminates

B.A.M.'s

in the

counsel

the

COUNTY'S and the District Court's erroneous application of
the Nollan-Dolan standard to the case. The District Court
concluded:
[w]hether the exaction at issue in this case is
considered as (a) a percentage of area of the
entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the
Westridge subdivision (i.e. 1.89%), or (b) the
resulting percentage loss to BAM of its available
building lots (i.e. 2.22%), it [the exaction] was
"roughly proportionate" to the increased traffic
volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed
development.
Emphasis added. Bracketed words added for clarity.
Any

mathematical

correlation

between

the

3.04% of

increased traffic count and the 1.89% or 2.22% numbers
both of which are intuitively going to be pretty close to
each other, given the way subdivisions
developed,

for

coincidental,

"lot
as

any

yield"
number

and
of

so

are platted and

forth

derived

is

purely

"hypothetical

examples" will readily show.
What
overlooked

the

COUNTY

and

the District

and/or misapplied

Court

is B.A.M.'s

have

claim

each

is that

B.A.M. had to pay 100% of the cost of hundreds of thousands
of dollars of "excessive" roadway improvements, of a roadway
for which the carrying capacity was increased from 12,000
per day to as much as 37,000+ vehicles per day: a tripling
of carrying capacity, albeit for that "half-width" and for
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that short roadway segment of "frontage". So even though the
County's introductory narrative on pages 1 and 2 of the
Order ["judgment"] correctly recite the legal posture of the
case [i.e. "that the County must make an individualized
determination of exactions imposed on a land developer
wherein the exactions must be 'roughly proportionate' to the
likely impact of the proposed development"], the County (and
the District Court) totally "miss it" on the mathematics, as
such is actually applied to and through "the law", and vice
versa.
If B.A.M. added

concededly so

the 3.04% to the

"daily traffic count" (440 vehicles per day, to the preexisting 12,000 or so vehicles per day) , B.A.M. should have
increased the need the paved surface of the roadway only the
corresponding 3.04%. [Mathematically, such would be about
500 square feet of dedication and paving, but not more.]
B.A.M. should not have been required to dedicate and pave an
additional 11,000+ square feet (and that's calculated from
the so-called "40-foot line"). Thus, the COUNTY'S legal
analysis and mathematics are both out-of-whack and flawed.
Taking the County-required dedication, and only the
paving thereof, alone, B.A.M. has been required to more than
double the paved portion roadway. Had the roadway been
improved merely to the so-called 33-foot line, the increase
in pavement alone would be in the 3 or 4 additional feet,
times

the

900

linear

feet

of

"frontage",

equals

approximately 3 000 square feet. The increase in paving alone
26

going from 33 feet to 53 feet adds an additional 18,000
square feet, on top of that starting amount: facially
obvious to be more than a doubling, whether B.A.M. [through
its manager, Mr McCleary] agreed or not.3 Any assumed
"agreement" on the part of B.A.M.

is merely what the

highway-abutting Ordinance simply required in the first
place. The COUNTY, as promulgator and beneficiary of that
Ordinance, should be estopped from asserting otherwise. As
Nollan accurately observed, the right to develop private
property is not a governmentally conferred benefit which can
be deemed to be consideration for the relationship, mutually
bargained for. The Ordinance always required the dedication,
so any claimed "agreement" on B.A.M.'s part is immaterial as
far as "takings" law is concerned. The lawsuit was filed
even before the "taking" was actually effected. [The COUNTY
knew all along it was being sued and could have "exacted" a
lesser quantity of real estate, etc.; indeed, the COUNTY
expressly rejected such a proposal: B.A.M. proposed to leave
the right-of-way undeveloped until UDOT actually would take
and develop the same.]

3

Mr McCleary in the April 2001 original trial testified
that he was essentially coerced into agreeing to practically
anything: the economic realities of the government-citizen
relationship are such
a fact rarely recognized by
government
the government has considerably more resources
and "hold-out capacity" than any citizen, particularly one
seeking governmentally-granted development approval wherein
the government literally has the citizen-propertyowner "over
the barrel" of economics.
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What B.A.M. "lost" (real estate, lot "yield", square
footage added to the existing paving, and so forth) is but
the "tip of the iceberg" injury: the "exaction" is defined
in terms of what B.A.M. was actually required to do

the

direct, out-of-pocket expense [the real estate "dedication"
AND the related improvements] to improve the public roadway,
over and above BAM's "roughly proportional" impact thereon
(as arguably expressed in terms of "traffic count" and so
forth) .
Neglecting the "traffic count" issues and focusing
strictly upon the roadway itself, pre-development the 3500
South Street was approximately 17 feet of paved surface
(half-width); post-development the paved surface alone was
in the 33 feet range. Thus, BAM essentially doubled the
paved surface alone! For which BAM's traffic count increase
was a mere 3.04% increase. When the adjacent improvements
are added, the "excessiveness" of the exaction becomes
astronomical,

even under

the

simplest

of

mathematical

comparisons or derivations.
Any number of "hypothetical examples" might be derived
to illuminate not only the flawed methodology, but also
effectively show that there is NO MATHEMATICAL CORRELATION
between the "traffic count" and the "real estate area"
available for the County-coerced "dedication", and that any
seeming

"rough proportionality" between the 2.2% (real

estate "taken") and the 3.04% (increased traffic count) is
strictly coincidental. [If the COUNTY had utilized ALL of
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the real estate actually "taken", the 2.2% would have been
actually much higher

not that such proves anything, other

than the numbers can be "tweaked" for about anything. There
is no correlation or relationship, for "law" purposes.]
Numerous

even an infinite number, theoretically

of

"hypothetical examples" could be developed and described to
illustrate the various "excessive" results, as per the
COUNTY'S methodology.

While

in mathematics

proper, no

particular theorem or postulate itself is satisfactorily
"proved by example" (or even proved by a series of examples
so proved, or even if no "examples" can be found to disprove
the assumed theorem). Math and logic don't work that way;
proof is proof and if proof is required, then the theorem
should be subject to a definitive proof.
We are not here dealing with issues which necessarily
lend themselves to the rigors or precision of a mathematical
"proof" of a precise mathematical theorem or postulate. We
are dealing here with fundamental "constitutional" issues
between a citizen and the government.
There

is

plain

and

simple

no

mathematical

correlation between the numbers which the COUNTY and the
District Court have asserted and concluded! Consequently,
and for related reasons, there is

as a matter of law

no

"rough proportionality" between the required dedication and
the impact ostensibly justifying that dedication, at least
as shown by the County's mathematics and legal analysis of
Dolan.
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On the other hand, a single "example" can certainly
disprove

the

rightness

or

logical

correctness

of

hypothesis, legal or mathematical. For example, assume
sake of illustration and argument

any
for

the correctness of the

COUNTY'S position and the District Court's "conclusion" (to
the effect that the developer, creating a 3.04% "impact" can
be coerced to lose up to 2.2% of his entire real estate, and
that such is "roughly proportional"). The error in this
illogical

and unrelated

result

is readily

seen by

the

following "hypothetical examples"4:
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #1.
Assume that instead of
the Developer's parcel be hundreds of feet in its
north-south
dimension,
is
rather
only
approximately
248
feet
in
its
north-south
dimension and is capable (as required by the
government) to install the "internal street" (60foot right-of-way) on the south side of a single
row of residences, ten (10) in number and which
are arbitrarily platted to be 145 feet "deep". The
highway-abutting Ordinance requires the dedication
to the 53-foot right-of-way line, because that's
what the COUNTY requires and that's what UDOT and
Wasatch Front would ultimately like to see. The 10
building lots will generate in the aggregate
approximately 100 vehicle-trips-per day, which
equals to only 0.80% (eight-tenths of one percent)
of the increased traffic count on the 3500 South
Street roadway, but the developer has been
required to dedicate 53 feet times 900 feet for
the roadway, which equals 21.3% of the developer's
real estate. [A "dedication" from the 17-foot line
to the 53-foot line would be 36 feet, or 14.5% of
the developer's total real estate.] CONCLUSION:
The 0.80% (eight-tenths of one percent) "impact"
4

The COUNTY may raise objection to these "hypothetical"
examples. These
"examples" illuminating
the
illogical
conclusions actually reached by the District Court are no more
objectionable than the COUNTY'S post-hearing mathematical
calculation and derivation of the 1.89% and 2.2% numbers
suggested to the District Court to support the "rough
proportionality" argument.
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bears absolutely no corresponding (i.e. "rough
proportionality" = "related both in nature and
extent") correlation to the area to be taken.
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2. Assume that the parcel
for the proposed development is located so that
its lay-out is generally along a north-south axis:
the parcel is 900 feet in a north south dimension,
and merely 170 feet in the east west dimension.
Further assume that ten single-family residences
could be developed thereon. The ten residences
generate
that same increased
traffic
count
"impact" of 100 vehicle-trips-per-day ( = 0.80%,
as measured against the pre-existing 12,000+
vehicles already on the 3500 South Street
roadway). IF the COUNTY "took" (required the
dedication of) area to the 53-foot right-of-way
line, such would be 53/900ths (which approximates
5.8% of the developer's total area).
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #1 and HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2,
examined together, evidence that the methodology adopted by
the COUNTY simply doesn't work: the required percentage of
land

dedication

impact"

(as

must

correlate

measured

in

to

the

actual

"traffic

vehicle-trips-per-day);

the

developer's "loss" should be function of the geographical
directional axis of the lay-out of his parcel. Any and all
apparent mathematical equivalency is purely coincidental.
Note that in each of the two foregoing "hypothetical
examples"

only

the

right-of-way

dedications

(ala

real

estate) are examined; the "hypothetical" do not address the
theoretically "constant" costs for the installed roadway
improvements. [In HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE #2, however, those
improvements

across

a

170-foot

east-west

dimensioned

"frontage" would be significantly less than those required
for a 900-foot frontage (in B.A.M.'s situation, in excess of
$200,000.00).]
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The Court of Appeals should not narrowly read Dolan
(which specifically dealt with a "dedication" only) and
ignore the "twin sister" (undersigned's terminology) issue
of

the

required

improvements

costs, which

are

just

as

constitutionally significant and integral to B .A.M. ' s claims
herein as the dedication of the real estate for the 3500
South Street roadway. The COUNTY Ordinance required BOTH
dedication and improvement; the B.A.M. pleadings identified
both components parts (dedication and improvements) and the
case was tried on that basis. The COUNTY should not be heard
to state that the

"improvements costs" are not part of

B.A.M.'s "inverse condemnation" claims for reimbursement for
the unconstitutionally-excessive governmental requirements .
B.A.M.

suggests

that

the

following

mathematical

approaches more correctly satisfy the correct analytical
methodology to evaluate and apply the Dolan standard of
"related both in nature and extent" to the impact of the new
development:
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #1. Because
the
preexisting
roadway
is
approximately
17
feet
(approximately 204 inches) in paved width across
the B.A.M. frontage, and because the B.A.M.
development will generate a new traffic increase
of only 3.04%, B.A.M. should pave an additional
3.04% to the existing quantity of asphalt. B.A.M.
would pave 3.04% of 204 inches ( = approximately
6 inches of additional "width"), for the length of
the 900-foot "frontage" of its development. That's
about 450 square feet [900 feet x 0.5 feet (i.e.
6 inches) = approximately 450 feet], which
albeit small--is a definable quantity. This
approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's
pronouncement pertaining to the seven requirements
of
the
"constitutional
standard
of
reasonableness", as identified in its decision of
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Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981),
specifically, criteria #1: "the cost of existing
facilities") . This approach is similar to that
applied in the case of Lafferty vs Payson City,
642 P. 2d 376 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) [Cityrequired electrical connection fees remanded for
proper application of Banberry criteria].
The foregoing approach arguably takes into account the
"cost of existing facilities" and attributes a value thereto
of 100%, without regard of any time-price comparison, and so
forth. It is simplistic in its approach and is, as Dolan
requires, "related both in nature and extent" to the impact
actually created by the B.A.M. development.
SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #2. Similar to SUGGESTED
METHODOLOGY #1, above, but B.A.M. cannot be made
to contribute more than the existing "cost of
existing facilities". Thus, if the 17-foot (i.e.
2 04 inch) paved roadway is worth $xxx.xx, and the
B.A.M. development will add 3.04% to the aggregate
traffic load of that paved portion, then B.A.M.
ought to pay an amount equal to 3.04% of the
monetary "cost of existing facilities". At the
trial, the COUNTY produced no evidence as to what
that "cost" of the existing 17 feet of paved
roadway might be; B.A.M. personnel testified that
the present "value" of the paved roadway might be
in the range of $1.25 per square foot for the
asphalt itself and $1.25 per square foot for the
preparation ( = $2.50 per square foot, total).
[Note that no value is attributed to the
underlying real estate, of the 17-foot paved area,
as B.A.M. owned that 17 feet, to the so-called
"centerline of the roadway". B.A.M. ought not to
have to pay for a proportionate cost of a portion
of roadway which is theoretically not even owned
by the government, even though B.A.M. would not be
entitled to collect "just compensation" for that
17 feet, as per Western Kane County Special
Service District No. 1 vs Jackson Cattle Company,
744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah 1987) [County government must
condemn and pay for portions of desired roadway
not previously paved] discussed herein. Thus,
mathematically, B.A.M. owes and should be expected
to "pay"
in a "dollar/monetary" analysis of the
situation
for
the
paving
only
of
only
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approximately 450 square feet time $2.50 per
square foot = $1125.00
not the $400,000+ B.A.M.
was actually required to "pay" through the in-kind
exactions and dedication.
In either of these two "methodologies", the B.A.M. arguments
of

"denial of equal protection" and of

the Banberry

"constitutional standard of reasonableness" are temporarily
overlooked, for the simplicity of the argument and result.
If the COUNTY'S approach were "fair" in its scope and
application, similarly-situated and nearby developments such
as "Elusive Estates", having the same

(or perhaps even

greater) traffic count "impact" would not be granted a "free
pass" and required to pay nothing. IF the County were to
"equalize" the entire across-the-board problem for all
subdivisions through the assessment and collection of a
"roads impact fee"
COUNTY

is

which the County has NOT adopted

statutorily precluded

from utilizing

the
"state

roadways" as a basis for any "roadway impact fee", as
prohibited by Section 11-36-102(14) (b) , Utah Code.
B.A.M.

identifies perhaps even a third

"suggested

methodology":
SUGGESTED

METHODOLOGY

#3

[illustrates

why

the

COUNTY's/District
Court's
methodologies
are
mathematically wrong] : The B.A.M. development adds
the 3.04% to the traffic count "impact". If the
value of the entire 17-foot "half-width" paved
portion of the roadway across the entire 900-foot
frontage is $2.50 per square foot, times 15,300
square feet (17 feet times 900 feet = 15,300
square feet) square feet, equals 30,600 + 7650 =
$38,250,
times
the
3.04%
= approximately
$1,125.00, which is the expected result, as per
METHODOLOGY #2 (the "dollar value" approach),
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above.5 This is a far cry from the $400,000+ which
B.A.M. was actually required to expend.
C
THE COUNTY'S RECENTLY-ADOPTED, CLAIMED COMPLIANCE
WITH THE DOLAN STANDARD IS DISINGENUOUS AND
BELIES THE COUNTY'S HISTORICALLY-ADVANCED POSITION
Until the Utah Supreme Court announced its decision in
this case (on certiorari review) , the COUNTY vigorously and
consistently asserted that the Dolan "rough-proportionality"
standard was inapplicable, particularly to a legislativelyprescribed exaction for which no "adjudicative decision" was
actually

made,

assertions

to

that

effect

Dolan's

the

"taking".

"individualized

The

COUNTY'S

determination"

element is inapplicable to the situation-at-hand

is not

merely intellectual, but lies at the core of this "appeal",
for very pragmatic reasons. At trial, and before the Court
of Appeals, the COUNTY argued that neither Nollan nor Dolan
was applicable. An example of this
historic position

the COUNTY'S

is found in its BRIEF for

review, in which the COUNTY asserted

in the

legal

certiorari
"headnote

(title) " to Point I of its arguments contained in its REPLY
BRIEF in the earlier "certiorari" proceeding, that there was
"no unconstitutional taking", ostensibly because the "rough
proportionality" test of Dolan did not apply. [Excerpts from
the COUNTY'S certiorari" briefs are attached as ATTACHMENT

5

This mathematical derivation is essentially equivalent to the
"monetary" calculations of SUGGESTED METHODOLOGY #2, albeit
utilizing differently-described quantities and factors: the result
for B.A.M. is nevertheless expectedly the same.
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#3 and ATTACHMENT #4 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] The COUNTY

thus misread the Dolan decision. The Utah Supreme Court
determined

otherwise: the

"constitutional" principle of

"rough proportionality" is constitutionally applicable to
all of these "takings" situations.
The "constitutional essence" of this case is literally
"boiled down" to the COUNTY'S written observations, although
the COUNTY'S conclusions totally miss the mark, as contained
in pages 5-6 of the COUNTY'S REPLY BRIEF in its "writ of
certiorari" claims before the Utah Supreme Court, thus:
The highway-dedication ordinance at issue here,
involves
a generally
applicable
legislative
assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is
imposed
or which can be imposed
individually.
As with any developer who chooses to develop a
parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required
here to comply with a uniform legislative scheme
which expects all similarly situated developers
[footnote omitted] to dedicate highway rights-ofway consistent with current uniform road-width
standards. Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to
ensuring that community development occurs in
accordance with sensible long-range transportation
planning. Otherwise, under BAM's view of the law,
road-width requirements for new construction along
major traffic corridors would vary radically from
parcel-to-parcel, depending on the size, usage,
and
other
impact
characteristics
of each
individual parcel. In practical
effect, an
"individualized" impact analysis would require a
different road-width dedication for every single
parcel located along the side of a highway. Rather
than having roadways with even and consistent
widths, road boundaries would be required to jut
in and out in front of each abutting parcel, as
dictated by an "individualized determination" of
each p a r c e l s traffic impact. The absurd practical
consequences of this application of Dolan "rough
proportionality" in such a case are obvious.
Pages

5-6 of COUNTY'S

REPLY

BRIEF.

Italicized

text in

original. Citation to footnote omitted. Previously,
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the

COUNTY

in its Opening Brief for certiorari

[p. 28]

characterized the "practical consequence" of following Dolan
as "absurd" and "nightmarish".
Obviously, what the COUNTY ignores in all of this is
the constitutional mandate: that government can obtain the
right-of-way roadway width of any dimension government
wants. However, the government must pay for it.
What

is

truly

"absurd"

and

"nightmarish"

is the

thought, as the COUNTY seemingly advocates, that government--whether by "legislative" or by "administrative" fiat or
decision, it really doesn't matter

can disregard the clear

constitutional mandate of the Just Compensation Clause.
As the "mathematical" applications described herein [in
either the "cost of existing facilities" or the "impact"
(defined in terms of daily traffic-count) context] clearly
show, the "de minimis", almost non-existent "reasonable
relationship" or "nexus" between the "permit condition"
(i.e. the required exaction = dedication and improvement)
and the impact created by the new development is such so as
to render the exaction constitutionally impermissible.
Indeed, the COUNTY'S long-standing, historic approach--even in the face of B.A.M.'s pre-litigation claims that the
Dolan decision prohibited the County's actions

was to

require the coerced dedications and improvements, without
regard to any "individualized determination" . Indeed, as the
COUNTY'S written arguments

(i.e. "different

road-width

dedication for every single parcel located along the side of
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a highway" and "road boundaries would be required to jut in
and out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated by an
"individualized determination" of each parcel's traffic
impact") to the Utah Supreme Court clearly evidence, the
COUNTY'S actual approach has become, quite literally, the
"out-and-out plan of extortion" anticipated in Nollan.
Indeed, the COUNTY'S approach is, quite literally, the
result that
a heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of
the compensation requirement, rather than the
stated police power objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added.
In light of the previous legal assertions made by the
COUNTY, the COUNTY should not be heard otherwise [i.e. "that
we (the COUNTY) complied with Dolan" when in fact the COUNTY
simply didn't (comply with Dolan)].
In the instant setting, the "heightened risk" that the
true

"purpose" behind

the COUNTY'S

arbitrarily-applied

"highway- abutting" dedication requirement (but non-existent
"building ban") is readily and unavoidably apparent and
transparent:

the

"avoidance

of

the

compensation

requirement", as the foregoing text identifies. The COUNTY'S
claim that the "stated police power objective" (of acquiring
right-of-way AND privately-installed public improvements) is
disingenuous, as well as being unconstitutionally-applied.
This is exactly the setting which is "a heightened risk"
that the development exaction (i.e. the roadway dedication
and improvements) is for the "avoidance of the compensation
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requirement" . Such is transparently clear from even the most
casual reading of the COUNTY' s "highway-abutting Ordinance" .
The COUNTY'S thinly-veiled attempt to disguise the
unconstitutional result must be judicially found to be
unconstitutional. As the above-referenced quotation from the
COUNTY'S own brief to the Utah Supreme Court shows, the
roadway dedication requirement has had as its fundamental
purpose the "avoidance of the compensation requirement" [of
the Just Compensation Clause], rather than a legitimate
stated police power objective.
Similarly, the COUNTY'S present position is contrary to
the evidence adduced at the original trial (April 2001), as
well as the October 2006 "remand hearing", wherein County
Traffic Engineer Andrea Pullos didn't really conduct the
"individualized

determination"

to

confirm

the

"rough

proportionality" ("related both in nature and extent to the
impact") which Dolan requires; rather, Ms Pullos simply
contacted UDOT and Wasatch Front Regional Council (a quasigovernmental

planning

agency)

and

asked

those

other

governmental agencies, in essence, "What do you want the
3500 South Street roadway, in year 2020, to be?". Any
testimony of Ms Pullos to the contrary (ala October 2006) is
the result of a Johnny-come-lately, back-peddling approach
adopted only after the Utah Supreme Court unanimously
announced the applicability of the Dolan standard.
The
following

"picture"
obvious

the

COUNTY

thus

feature, which
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"paints"

the COUNTY

has

the

seemingly

ignores: ONLY "highway-abutting" parcels are singled out for
the roadway dedication requirement. The development of other
similarly-situated

parcels

"highway-abutting",

but

described not

rather

generally

in terms of
in

terms

of

creating the same impact (i.e. vehicular traffic added to
the

roadway

infrastructure)

are

exempt

from

any

"dedication" and "improvement installation" requirements.
The COUNTY is correct that under the "individualized
determination"

standard of Dolan, the improved roadway

widths would "jut in and out" along the frontage of the
abutting

parcel. What

the

COUNTY

in

its

self-serving

"constitutional myopia" is refusing to recognize, but which
the Court will readily acknowledge, is that there is another
potential result: namely, that the Government can have
roadways of whatever width it chooses, but the Government
must pay "just compensation" for the property interests it
"takes".

Understood

in

its

essential

substance

procedure, the "highway-abutting" Ordinance has
and in law

and

in fact

as its transparent purpose, "the avoidance of

the Just Compensation requirement". The Ordinance, rather
than being legitimized, is thus condemned, as the Nollan
Court described:
the legislative scheme becomes an out-and-out plan
of extortion.
107 SCt at 3149. Emphasis added.
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c
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
AND APPLY THE "UTAH STATE LAW" STANDARDS
APPLICABLE TO THE DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS
The

"reasonable

relationship"

standard

previously

adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in cases such as Call vs
City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P. 2d 217 (Utah Supreme Court
1979) , on rehearing 614 P.2d 1259 (1980) , reversed on other
grounds

727

P.2d

180

(1986),

and

Banberry

Development

Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah Supreme
Court

1981)

in

which

the

"reasonable

standard was identified and adopted

relationship"

are essentially one-

and-the-same standard. [In fact, the United States Supreme
Court

in Dolan

and in Nolan

identified Utah as having

adopted the "reasonable relationship" standard prevalent
among the state courts which have decided the issue.] It is
perhaps unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court
developed a new phrase "rough proportionality" to describe
judicial standards which had previously been part of the
Utah legal

landscape. Notwithstanding,

"rough proportionality" standard

the

newly-coined

(of Dolan) is the exact

equivalent of the "reasonable relationship" standard of Call
and of Banberry under state law.]
In 1981

almost two decades ago

the Utah Supreme

Court was presented with the case of Banberry Development
Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah Supreme
Court 1981) . In Banberry a real estate developer challenged
South

Jordan

City's

required
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parks

and

culinary

water

connection "impact fees" and "exactions". In resolving the
legal issue and going to great lengths to establish landmark
precedence

certainly for Utah

the Utah Supreme Court

wrote:
The Home Builders case established the
principle upon which the reasonableness of the
water connection fee in this case should be
judged. The "fair contribution" of the connecting
party should not exceed "the expense thereof met
by others." Or, as the New Jersey Supreme Court
held in a subsequent case, the rules governing the
allocation of improvement costs between city and
developer would ideally have been such as to
insure, to the greatest extent practicable, that
the cost of extending a municipal water facility
would fall equitably upon those who are similarly
situated and in a just proportion to benefits
conferred. They should be sufficiently flexible
to permit consideration to be given to the facts
and circumstances
of each particular case.
Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of E.
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505 (1972).
Therefore, where the fee charged a new subdivision
or a new property hookup exceeds the direct costs
incident thereto (as a means of sharing the costs
of common facilities), the excess must survive
measure against the standard that the total costs
"fall equitably upon those who are similarly
situated and in a just proportion to benefits
conferred." Stated otherwise, to comply with the
standard of reasonableness, a municipal fee
related to services like water and sewer must not
require newly developed properties to bear more
than their equitable share of the capital costs in
relation to benefits conferred.
To determine the equitable share of the
capital costs to be borne by newly developed
properties, a municipality should determine the
relative burdens previously borne and yet to be
borne by those properties in comparison with the
other properties in the municipality as a whole;
the fee in question should not exceed the amount
sufficient to equalize the relative burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
631 P. 2d at 904. Emphasis added. The Utah Supreme Court
continued, by identifying seven criteria to be evaluated to
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determine the "relative burden already borne and yet to be
borne" by the newly-developed properties.
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting approvingly from a New
Jersey court opinion, continued:
The rule we lay down must be given a pragmatic
application. Complete equality of treatment may
sometimes be impossible, especially where a
municipality has followed no set pattern with
respect
to past
extensions. Nor
should a
municipality be denied the right to modify an
established pattern where altered circumstances
reasonably so dictate. Equality of treatment may
upon occasion be forced to give way before some
supervening public interest. But insofar as such
equality can reasonably be achieved this must be
done,
631 P. 2d at 904. Emphasis added. It is obvious that the Utah
Supreme

Court

intends

creating the "impact"

that

everyone

that

is,

those

should pay, "equally" if possible

but "almost equally as possible", in any regard.
The Utah Supreme Court continued:
Reasonableness
obviously
holds
the
municipality to a higher standard of rationality
than the requirement that its actions not be
arbitrary or capricious.
As with water connection fees, the amount of
such exactions or fees should be such that the
burden of providing these municipal services
"falls equitably upon those who are similarly
situated and in a just proportion to benefits
conferred." Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. Township of
E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 286 A.2d 498, 505
(1971). The measurement of "benefits conferred"
may have a more significant impact on the
reasonableness
of park fees than on water
connection fees.
The central facilities that
support water and sewer service would generally
confer the same benefits in every part of the
municipality, but the benefits conferred by
recreational, flood control, or other dispersed
resources may be measurably different in different
parts of the municipality. Park improvement fees
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should therefore be fixed so as to be equitable in
light of the relative benefits conferred on, as
well as the relative burdens previously borne and
yet to be borne by, the newly developed properties
in comparison with the other properties in the
municipality as a whole.
The fees in question
should not exceed the amount sufficient to
equalize the relative benefits and burdens of
newly developed and other properties.
631 P. 2d at 903. Emphasis added. Public roadways, like
"parks", are "dispersed resources". In fact, roadways are
arguably the most "dispersed" of all governmentally-owned
resources.
In Call vs City of West Jordan, Utah, 606 P. 2d 217
(Utah Supreme

Court

1979),

on

rehearing

614

P.2d

1259

(1980), reversed on other grounds 727 P.2d 180 (1986), the
Utah Supreme Court defined and established the Utah standard
as to the constitutional validity of "impact fees"

(and,

implicitly, "in-kind exactions"), to be one of "reasonable
relationship"

(that

is,

there

must

be

a

reasonable

relationship between the needs created by the development
and the impact fee (or in-kind exaction) required of the
developer.
The COUNTY is similarly prohibited from utilizing the
"in-kind exaction" to cure pre-existing deficiencies. County
Traffic

Engineer

did

testify

the

roadway

improvements

required of B.A.M. would raise the "service level" of the
pre-existing
brainer".
roadway

3500

South roadway. That's

an obvious

"no

[Raising the "service level" of the 3500 South
from

its

present

(1997)

"service

level

D

(approaching gridlock)" to "service level B (almost free44

flowing)"

is,

deficiency"

in

essence,

"curing

the

pre-existing

nevertheless unconstitutionally imposed upon

a single developer, the Plaintiff B.A.M.]
That government should pay for the additional property
so

acquired

(from

the

existing

1997

paved

roadway

extending 17 feet to the lip of the asphalt paving) is
mandated by a long line of Utah judicial decisions. See, for
example, Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1
vs Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P. 2d 13 76 (Utah Supreme Court
1987) [holding that the government must condemn and pay for
those portions of the intended roadway which are outside of
that portion of the roadway which might be claimed to be
public from previous usage].
In the instant situation, as suggested by the COUNTY
and so found/concluded by the District Court, there simply
is neither the "in nature" nor the "in extent" relationship
(i.e. combined "rough proportionality") to the required
dedication.

The

derived

percentage

of

2.2%

of

the

development's available real estate has no correlation
related

"in nature"

and

related

"in extent"

to the

required dedication (i.e. impact, of 3.04% of additional
cars on-the-road).
Moreso than merely adopting the coined-phrase "rough
proportionality", the United States Supreme Court in Dolan
went

to

great

"constitutional"

lengths

to

describe

the

foundational

significance of the Just

Compensation

Clause: that the government is required to pay for the
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private property being "taken".
Moreso than adhering only to the simplistic phrase
"roughly proportional" (and all of its mathematical and/or
conceptual

connotations), the extensive narrative

text

quotations from Dolan shown above unqualifiedly evidence the
Supreme Court's directive: that there is simply more than
mathematical calculation here at issue. Propertyowners whose
property is "taken" by governments are entitled to Just
Compensation
COUNTY'S

Clause

remedies.

Plain

and

and the District Court's

simple.

The

"mathematics" and

"law" are simply out-of-whack.
In an "apples-to-apples" comparison

not the "apples-

to-oranges" non-correlation the County advanced and the
District Court accepted
increased

"traffic

a 3.04% "impact" (as measured by

count"

is

simply

NOT

"roughly

proportional" to a 100% of the cost!
The COUNTY'S requirement that the Plaintiff install
improvements which are in excess of the needed improvements
projected for more than twenty years

to year 2020

into

the future is certainly constitutionally suspect: certainly
"excessive" given the 3.04% increase in traffic count.
What

Nollan

and

Dolan

expect

is

adherence

to

constitutional principle: that government may not condition
development approval upon the uncompensated "taking" of
private

property

for public

use, unless

the

"taking"

correlates to the impact actually created!
Nolan is NOT merely about some beachfront property and
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the beautiful views which might be enjoyed by members of the
public

as they saunter across a former

privately-owned

beach! Dolan is NOT merely about a jogging path adjacent to
a creek, which sometimes overflowed during the rainy season.
Nollan and Dolan are about constitutional principles which
have direct

application,

factually and

legally,

to the

issues at bar. Nollan would not have a different analysis or
result had the California requirement been phrased

"all

ocean-abutting properties shall dedicate an easement" . Dolan
would not have had a different analysis or result that the
City's requirement been phrased "all Fanno Creek-abutting
properties shall dedicate an easement . . .".
In essence,

literally,

this

case and

the

COUNTY'S

methodology illuminates a situation which the United States
Supreme Court has characterized as the
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of
the
compensation
requirement
[of
the
Just
Compensation Clause], rather than the stated
police power objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added. Bracketed material added
for clarity.
CONCLUSION
The COUNTY'S requirement as to the dedication and full
improvement

of

extraordinarily

the

53-foot

roadway

excessive, under

[Nollan and Dolan] and state

terms

[Banberry]

"half-width"
of both

are

federal

"constitutional"

law.
The

COUNTY's

late-adopted
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"individualized

determination" of the impact created by the "Westridge
Meadows"

development

and

its

"reasonable

relationship"

("rough proportionality") to those needs fails miserably.
The COUNTY failed in its burden to establish that the
required dedications are reasonably "related in both in
nature and extent of the proposed development."
The COUNTY has unconstitutionally required a single
property-owner to bear substantial expenses, which should be
borne by the public-at-large.
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the
District Court [incorrectly adjudicating the matter on these
"matters of law" issues] and direct the District Court to
enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
County:
1.

Declaring

the

required

dedications

and

exactions to be unconstitutionally "excessive" and
to be in violation of constitutional provisions,
as herein described and shown;
2.

Awarding the Plaintiff the reasonable value of

the dedications and improvements, including the
"severance damages" against the remainder parcel
(calculated on the basis of the retail selling
price of the two building lots "lost" by reason of
the

excessive

dedication),

together

with

the

improvement costs of the 3500 South Street roadway
improvements, "unconstitutionally excessive" in
light of the barrier fencing and the requirement
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that the developer install the "internal street"
for the northernmost row of building lots;
3.

Awarding such other relief as is appropriate.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of June, 2007.

rney -£Or Appellant
.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.
CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be hand-delivered to the office of Mr
Donald H Hansen, Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney,
Suite #S-3400 Salt Lake County Government Center, 2001 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190, this 19th day of
June, 2 0 07.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 980908157

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah,

:

Defendant.

This matter was last before the Court on October 17, -2006.

Counsel

and the parties were present.
The matter before the Court was based upon a remand from the Supreme
Court to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court.
The Supreme Court, on December 13, 2005, issued its Opinion relating
to the plaintiff's appeal of this Court's ruling on plaintiff's claims
at the conclusion of the previous trial when this Court found the issues
in this case in favor of the defendant Salt Lake County, and against the
plaintiff B.A.M. Development.
The Supreme Court, in the aforementioned Opinion, determined that
this

Court

erred

when

it

refused

to

apply

the

so-called

proportionality" test in evaluating the plaintiff's claims.

"rough

The remand

required this Court to review the evidence at the'original trial, take

ATTACHMENT 1

B.A.M. V.
SALT LAKE COUNTY
any

new

evidence

PAGE 2
that

was

MEMORANDUM DECISION

appropriate,

and

then

reevaluate

the

plaintiff's claims, applying the "rough proportionality" test.
Following the taking of new evidence on October 17, 2006, this Court
reviewed

the

evidence

from

the original

trial

and prior hearings,

together with the evidence received on October 17, 2006.

The Court also

reviewed the relevant legal briefs filed by the parties during this
proceeding, both before and after the Supreme Court's decision, and has
evaluated

the

plaintiff's

claim

using

the

"rough

proportionality"

standard as required by the Supreme Court, and has also noted the recent
statutory enactments referred to by the Supreme Court in its Opinion.
Having used those standards, the Court finds that the defendant's
exactments required of the plaintiff for approval of its development are
roughly

proportional

development.

to

the

impact

of

the

plaintiff's

proposed

Further, the Court finds that there is an essential link

between the governmental interests and each exaction.

The Court finds

the defendant's evidence and legal arguments persuasive, and that they
form a basis for the factual findings referenced above.
The Court will enter an appropriate Order to be prepared by counsel
for the defendant, together with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;,
determining

that

the plaintiff's

claims are dismissed,

no cause of

action, on any of the claims set forth in plaintiff's Complaint and that
the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

ATTACHMENT 1

B.A.M. V.
SALT LAKE COUNTY

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Counsel for the defendant, after preparing the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal, should submit the same to the
undersigned in care of Kathy Westwood, Judge Kate Toomey's lead clerk,
who will ensure that the documents are made available to the undersigned
for review and signature.

The submissionyof the final Orders should be

all in accordance with the Rules of Civ^l Procedure.
Dated

this

_day of December , / 2 0 0 6 .
*******

JA

r*X

BY j ^ H A».QNn ^^hf ^
:simc,i\ COURT j'u^Gfc
tr-f<VN
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this

day of

December, 2006

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Plaintiff
9225 S. Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Donald H. Hansen
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
2001 S. State Street, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190

Mil-
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LOHRA L. MILLER (USB # 6420)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

FILED DISTRICT COURT

DONALD H. HANSEN (USB # 1332)
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street #S3700
Salt Lake City UT 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-3421
Facsimile: (801)468-2622
Attorneys for Defendant Salt Lake County

Third Judicial District

JAN 1 \ 2007
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Deputy
Clerk

—

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW and ORDER ON REMAND

Plaintiff
Civil No. 980908157 CD
Judge TIMOTHY HANSON
[On remand from Utah Court of Appeals No.
20010840-CA and
Utah Supreme Court No. 20040365]

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant

The above captioned civil action came on regularly for a bench trial on October 17, 2006 on
an order of remand by the Utah Supreme Court (see decision and remand order, Utah Supreme Court
No. 20040365, at 2006 UT 2, 128 P.3d 1161).
The issues before the district court on remand are (1) whether a highway right-of-way
dedication required by defendant Salt Lake County ["County"] as a condition of approving the
subdivision development application of plaintiff B.A.M. Development, LLC ["BAM"] was "roughly
proportionate" to the impact likely to be created by BAM's proposed development, and (2) whether
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the County made an "individualized determination" of such rough proportionality with respect to
BAM's proposed development. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm 'n, 107 S.Ct 3141 (1987)
and Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S.Ct 2309 (1994) for the proposition that the County must make
an individualized determination of exactions imposed on a land developer wherein the exactions
must be "roughly proportionate" to the likely impact of the proposed development. Dolan, 114 S.Ct
at 2319. On appeal, neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Utah Supreme Court addressed
BAM's appeal of this court's dismissal of BAM's "equal protection,'' "uniform operation of laws"
and "equitable estoppel"causes of action. See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
entered July 30, 2001 ( R. 266-273).
At the remand trial, Plaintiff was represented by Stephen G. Homer, Esq., and Defendant
was represented by Donald H. Hansen, Deputy District Attorney. The parties waived opening
argument, presented their respective evidence and closing arguments. The Court then took this
matter under advisement, reviewed the trial exhibits and testimony received at the remand trial on
October 17, 2006, reviewed the exhibits and transcribed witness testimony from the original trial of
on April 23 and 24, 2001, and examined memoranda submitted by the parties and the legal
authorities cited therein.
The Court, being fully advised, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 30, 1997, Salt Lake County [hereinafter, "the County"] received the
application and proposed plat of plaintiff B.A.M. Development [ "BAM"] for its
proposed Westridge Meadows subdivision ["Westridge"] to be developed at
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approximately 7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. BAM's
proposed plat included a 40-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street running
along the north boundary of BAM's property.
2.

On August 26, 1997, BAM's subdivision proposal was approved by Salt Lake
County engineering and development staff, subject to compliance with County road
standards, including a 40-foot right-of-way ["ROW"] highway dedication of land
abutting 3500 South street.

3.

The County's ROW requirement was imposed pursuant to Salt Lake County
Ordinance §15.28.010, enacted under authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 18-27-801.
Under certain circumstances, the County ordinance required dedication of highway
ROW space by developers of property abutting a major or secondary highway in
accordance with the County's Transportation Master Plan.

4.

The County relied upon traffic projections and recommendations of the Wasatch
Front Regional Council and the Utah Department of Transportation ["UDOT"] in
formulating its Transportation Master Plan. The road-width recommendations of the
Wasatch Front Regional Council were based upon a long-range transportation study
projecting highway capacity needs in Salt Lake County to the year 2020.

5.

On or about June 10,1998, the County's transportation engineer was informed by the
Wasatch Front Regional Council and UDOT that the currently required highway
ROW for 3500 South at the relevant location was 106-feet total width (i.e., 53-foot
half-width). The County then incorporated the revised ROW requirement into its
Transportation Master Plan.
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On or about June 15, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County's transportation engineer,
approved BAM's subdivision proposal subject to compliance with current Salt Lake
County roadway standards, including the 53-foot half-width ROW dedication of
3500 South street.
On June 23, 1998, the County planning commission gave preliminary approval to
BAM's amended plat, requiring a 53-foot highway dedication at 3500 South Street.
On July 2, 1998, BAM filed a Notice of Appeal of the Planning Commission's
dedication requirement of a 53-foot ROW, rather than a ROW of 40-feet. BAM's
appeal did not challenge any other conditions of subdivision approval imposed by the
County.
On July 15, 1998, the Board of County Commissioners denied BAM's appeal.
On June 23, 1999, the County Planning Commission approved BAM's amended
subdivision plat, which had been modified by BAM to include the required 53-foot
highway dedication..
On August 18, 1999, the Board of County Commissioners granted final approval of
the Westridge subdivision plat with the 53-foot highway dedication.
On August 27, 1999, the Westridge subdivision plat was recorded with the Salt Lake
County Recorder's Office; BAM thereafter constructed the subdivision.
The increase of the highway ROW dedication required of BAM from 40-feet to 53feet resulted in a loss to BAM of one building lot in the Westridge subdivision.
In or around April, 1998, Andrea Pullos, the County transportation engineer,
conducted an analysis of historical and projected traffic volumes on 3500 South street
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in the "traffic link" between 7200 West and 8400 West streets.
15.

BAM's proposed development was located within this traffic link at approximately
7700 West.

16.

Transportation engineers typically study traffic patterns on a given street by isolating
a "traffic link" on the street between major intersecting cross streets.

17.

Ms. Pullos' traffic analysis relied, in part, upon historical traffic data compiled by
UDOT reflecting increasing traffic volume on 3500 South street within the 7200
West-8400 West link.

18.

As a result of her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that BAM's proposed
subdivision development was likely to generate an additional 440 vehicle trips per
day on 3500 South street. This calculation assumed ten (10) vehicle trips per day per
additional housing unit.

19.

The assumption often (10) vehicle trips per day per household is a generally
recognized standard in the field of transportation engineering.

20.

Ms. Pullos determined that the additional 440 vehicle trips per day likely to be
generated by BAM's proposed development represented an increased traffic volume
of 3.04% on 3500 South street within the traffic link.

21.

In conducting her traffic analysis, Ms. Pullos determined that the impact of the 3.04%
increased traffic volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed development was
roughly proportionate to the additional land required for highway dedication by
BAM, as a percentage of the entire parcel owned by BAM.
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22.

The area of entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the Westridge subdivision
consisted of 619,781.54 square feet.

23.

The additional 13-feet of highway dedication area required to be dedicated by BAM
was 11,696.23 square feet (i.e., 13 feet multiplied by 899.71 lineal feet, the length of
the frontage of BAM's parcel abutting 3500 South street).

24.

Therefore, the additional dedication required of BAM represented 1.89% of the entire
BAM parcel (11,696.23/619,781.54 = .01887).

25.

The additional 13-feet of highway dedication area required to be dedicated by BAM
resulted in the loss of one building lot, from 45 lots to 44 lots.

26.

Therefore, the dedication resulted in a loss to BAM of 2.22% of its available building
lots (1/45 =.02222).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

In this action, BAM challenges the required 53-foot highway dedication as well as
various other conditions of the subdivision approval imposed by the County, or
"exactions," such as installation of curb and gutter, paving, storm and sewer lines,
and other items. However, since the only issue appealed by BAM to the County
Board of Commissioners was the County's requirement of a 53-foot highway
dedication, rather than a 40-foot dedication, that is the only issue ripe for adjudication
before this Court, because the County never made a final decision on any other issue
now raised in this action by BAM Development since such issues were not part of
BAM's administrative appeal. See, Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3116 (1985).
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2.

The County's highway right-of-way dedication requirement, as applied in this case,
is a development "exaction" as that term is used in the Nollan and Dolan decisions
of the United States Supreme Court and elsewhere in American "takings" law.

3.

Under the Nollan and Dolan decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other
controlling "takings" precedents, a finding of "rough proportionality" between a
development exaction and the impact likely to be created by a proposed development
does not require "mathematical precision."

The proportionality need only be

approximate, or "rough."
4.

The additional 440 vehicle trips per day likely to be generated by BAM's proposed
development represented an increased traffic volume on 3500 South street within the
traffic link, or "impact," of 3.04%.

5.

Whether the exaction at issue in this case is considered as (a) a percentage of the area
of the entire parcel owned by BAM comprising the Westridge subdivision {i.e.,
1.89%), or (b) the resulting percentage loss to BAM of its available building lots
(i.e., 2.22%), it was "roughly proportionate" to the impact in increased traffic
volume likely to be created by BAM's proposed development.

6.

Defendant Salt Lake County, through its transportation engineer, in or around April
1998, made an "individualized determination" of "rough proportionality" between
the required development exaction and the likely impact of BAM's proposed
development.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of the defendant Salt Lake County and
therefore
ORDERS that no cause of action is found against Defendant Salt Lake County on any claim
set forth in Plaintiffs Complaint, and said Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

Dated this

day of_

njua^

2007.

7
Utah 'phird District Court
By:

M-->r. .v
•

( / •

• • • ' • . , . . .

•

* .

7IMOTHV R \ ^ 4 N S 0 N :
District C^rt^xlge ~^y'

Approved as to form:

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney for Plaintiff
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(a) the County lacked a ^legitimate governmental interest" in transportation corridor
planning15, or (b) that the highway dedication ordinance is not "reasonably related" to such
an interest. See, Smith Investment ai 95^ i\2d 252. As a facial takings challenger, BAM
must carry the burden of showing that the ordinance "does not advance legitimate state
interests." See. Smith. Investment,95$ \> .Aial in. 1 8; see also, Dolan v. CitvofTigarcLsi(f)r<i.
512 U.S. at 385, 1 MS.Ct. at 2316 (1994). But this proposition BAM has not even attempted
to establish. Accordingly, BAM did not and cannot meet its burden under a facial challenge
to the County's highway-dedication ordinance.
All four cases cited by BAM arc readily distinguishable from the instant case in thai
they concern exactions mandated in response to individual impact characteristics which were
unique to the developments in each case. In this case, however, the County highwaydedication requirement operates independently of any unique characteristics or proposed uses
of specific parcels to which it applies. As with any land subdivider who chooses to develo;.)
a parcel which abuts a highway, BAM was required here simply to comply with a uniform
legislative scheme which expects similarly situated land subdivided 0 to dedicate highway
rights-of-way consistent with current uniform road-width standards.
Such a uniform scheme is fundamental to ensuring that community development

,D

In fact, BAM concedes that the County has a valid interest in this respect.
Appellant's Brief (Court of Appeals), p. o.
'""Similarly situated" developers are those who, like BAM, develop property
which abuts a major or secondary highway. See County Code of Ordinances, Sec.
15.28.010
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occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation planning. Otherwise, under
BAM's view of constitutional law, road-widih requirements for new construction along
major traffic corridors would vary radically from parccl-to-parcel, depending on the size.
usage, and other impact characteristics ofeach individual parcel. In practical effect, the BAM
doctrine would require a different, road-width dedication for every single parcel located along
the side of a highway.

Rather than having roadway segments with even and consistent

widths, road edges and shoulders would be required to jut in and out in front of each abutting
parcel, as dictated by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's impact. Th/absurd
anci/TnghtmarishY)ractical consequences of this notion are obvious.
However, while BAM correctly perceives the County's highway-dedication ordinance
as a generalized ^location-based" exaction, as opposed to an individualized "impact-based"
exaction like those in the cases upon winch BAM relies, it still insists that the County's
ordinance must pass muster under the "individualized' 1 Dolan approach.
This distinction is critical to determining the proper analysis for constitutional review
In the recent California Supreme Court case ol'San Re/no Hotel, L.P. v. City and County oj
San Francisco,41 P.3d 87, 27 Cal.4lh 043, 1 17 Cal. Rptr.2d (Cal. 2002), this very distinction
was discussed at length, and specifically m die context o\ the DuLin "proporuonaiitN"
analysis. There, the plaintiff-hotel owner sought a city permit to convert a long-term rental
housing facility into a short-term tourist rental facility.

The city imposed a "housing

replacement^ exaction which required plaintiff-- and all other residential hotel conversion
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this stringent constitutional d e m a n d when the dedication requirement was only 40-feet, instead
of 53-feei. H A M f lif. in e\pl.iiii IMW or w h y the additioi 1; ll 13 It *et c )f reqi in e< :1 rij >ht-of-way
dedication elevated this case to constitutional dimensions. Again, BAM focuses erroneously
upon the degree (i.e., quantity) of the dedication, rather than its underlying source and character
(i.e., legislative).
The highway-dedication nrdm.m.. ,ii issue here, in\ wives a generally

applicable

legislative assessment (or "exaction"), not one which is imposed - or which can be imposed ~
individually. As with any developer who chooses to develop a parcel which abuts a highway,
BAM was required here to comply with a iiniform legislative scheme which expects all
similarly situated developers7 to dedicate highway rights-of-way consistent witl 1 ci irrent uniform
road-width standards. Such a uniforni scheme is fundanlenial to ensuring that c o m m u n i t y
development occurs in accordance with sensible long-range transportation plainling. Otherwise,
under B A M ' s view of the law, road-width requirements for n e w construction along major
traffic corridors would vary radically from parcel-to parcel, depending on the size, usage, and

opening brief (q. v., at p p . 20 - 32) inasmuch as the latter cases u i n v o l v [ e d ] imposition of a
general scheme of fees or regulations on development that are similar to general
applications of local governmental police power," and not the "forced physical
occupation of private property as a condition of development.1' Amicus Brief, pp. 8 - 9.
In this regard, the amicus is correct. However, like BAM, the amicus does not cite any
cases arising from highway right-of-way dedication statutes or ordinances, which further
suggests that this issue - presented in this particular context - is a matter of first
impression.
7

"Similarly situated" developers are tluov. v, nw, i,Lc 15AM, develop property which
abuts a major or secondary highway. Sec Co>wih'» '• ><v ,it ()rdinanees. Sec. 1 5.28.010
PAGI; 5 or

15
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other impact characteristics of each individual parcel. In practical effect, an "individualized"
impact analysis would require a different road-width dedication for every single parcel located
along the side of a highway. Rather than having roadways with even and consistent widths.
road boundaries would be required tojut in and out in front of each abutting parcel, as dictated
by an "individualized determination" of each parcel's traffic impact. Th/absurd practical
consequences of this application of Dolan "rough proportionality" in such a case a?e obvious.
The exaction in this case then, is not an "ad hoc" discretionary assessment imposed on
an individualized basis at the whim of some bureaucrat, or based on unique impact factors
attributable exclusively to BAM's particular development. Rather, as the trial court concluded,
the County highway-dedication ordinance
"imposes the requirement of dedication on a broad class of property owners who
choose to develop property which abuts a major or secondary highway [and] the
assessment of how much property had to dedicated was not individualized, but
rather was made pursuant to the generally applicable County Transportation
Master Plan and applied across the board to all owners whose property abutted
3500 South."
Memorandum Decision, p. 3 | R. 249]. As such, it should be accorded deferential scrutiny on
review and upheld so long as it "advances a legitimate governmental interests."
The County acknowledges that the Nollan "essential nexus" test is a valid requirement
for constitutional analysis of a development exaction 8 . While the Court of Appeals' dissenting
opinion found that the County's highway dedication ordinance passed the "essential nexus"
s

While the Nollan court devised the phrase "essential nexus" to distinguish its
takings analysis from the "rational relationship"test evolved in its line of equal protection
decisions, the phrases are functionally indistinguishable.
PAOH 6 or
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